As reported on November 5, 2026, Polymarket and Binance had proposed a Polygon PoS hard fork to recover POL frozen after two security incidents. The proposal had not been adopted. Their teams were due to present it at a Polygon protocol governance meeting at 22:30 Beijing time that day.
The proposed state change would set the balances of five addresses identified as attacker-controlled to zero and credit an equal amount—approximately 70.49 million POL—to recovery addresses designated by Polymarket and Binance. The proposal valued the POL at about $6.7 million. Because the same amount would be removed and credited, it would not change POL’s total supply.
The proposal followed October 30 compromises of Polymarket’s front end and a Binance hot wallet. According to the report, Polygon validators froze four addresses associated with the Polymarket incident, holding 23.86 million POL, and one associated with the Binance incident, holding 46.63 million POL. The report said Polymarket had sought the attackers’ cooperation without receiving a reply. The proposal also alleged that the attackers offered Polygon validators cash to unfreeze the addresses; that claim was attributed to the proposal, not independently established in the report.
The trust boundary is the difference between freezing an address and changing its balance. The reported freeze prevented movement of the POL. The proposed fork would go further: it would reassign balances without signatures from the addresses’ private keys. Polymarket and Binance said the change should apply only to these incidents and should not establish a general recovery mechanism.
The original report argued that overriding address balances could damage confidence in Polygon’s rules, while noting that no public position on the proposal had yet been given by Polygon officials, relevant governance members or core developers. It also reported that Polymarket and Binance had already compensated affected users. Its assessment that the fork was unlikely to pass was an opinion, not a governance result.
There are historical comparisons, but neither determines Polygon’s decision. Ethereum’s 2016 hard fork following The DAO exploit led to the continuation of the original chain as Ethereum Classic. More recently, Core Network announced on November 2 that a hard fork had recovered 68,146,177.22 CORE from three attacker-controlled addresses after an unauthorized October 31 withdrawal involving about 97 million staked CORE. The Polygon proposal remained a separate decision about whether to move already-frozen balances.


